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Chapter 4:
Whose Water? Corporatization 
of a Common Good
Vanessa Casado Perez*
I. Introduction
Powerful companies are investing in water as a result of climate change and 
their participation in water markets has negative effects on the communities 
from where the water comes. Examples abound. In the foothills of Mount 
Shasta in northern California, the town of Weed is fighting a water war. 
Weed has relied on spring water to cover a water deficit caused by a prolonged 
drought. Weed had paid Roseburg Forest Products (Roseburg), a timber 
company that owns the land containing the spring, $1 a year for spring water 
for more than 50 years. That arrangement ended in 2019, however, when 
Roseburg saw a business opportunity and began charging Weed $97,500 a 
year for water while telling Weed to soon find water elsewhere. Purport-
edly, Roseburg is likely interested in selling the water previously consumed 
by Weed to Crystal Geyser Alpine Spring, a California-based bottled water 
company. After having relied on Roseburg’s water for more than five decades, 
Weed residents argue the water should not just be sold to the highest bidder.1
Water markets, broadly understood, include transactions like the Rose-
burg one and more traditional exchanges between neighboring users. Water 
transfers can mitigate the effects of water scarcity, allowing allocation of 
1. The outrage, however, may be somewhat contained because the timber company landowner is a large 
employer in the area. See Thomas Fuller, Timber Company Tells California Town, Go Find Your Own 
Water, N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 2016. Another example is the controversy in East Texas where Ozarka, a 
Nestlé subsidiary, outraged the residents by bottling local spring water—a problem compounded by 
the state’s rule of capture for groundwater. According to the rule of capture, landowners can pump as 
much water as they want from aquifers underlying their lands, but so can the landowners’ neighbors. 
If the neighbor is a big, multinational beverage company, its pumps and extraction rate will exceed 
smaller users, including municipalities. Stuart Eskenazi, The Great Sucking Sound, Hous. Press (Nov. 
19, 1998, 4:00 AM), https://www.houstonpress.com/news/the-great-sucking-sound-6569533.
* I would like to thank participants in the 2019 Texas A&M Law Faculty retreat, the Houston Law 
Center Environment, Energy, and Natural Resources Center (EENR) Work-in-Progress Roundtable, 
and the Environmental Law Collaborative. I would also like to thank my research assistants Steffani 
Fausone and Elizabeth Weis.
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water to those willing to pay more for it.2 These reallocations purportedly 
benefit society because water is used where it can generate more marginal 
return. Market advocates argue that free-market transactions are better than 
bureaucratic allocations. Water agencies may not have as much information 
as users do about the relative value of water and may allocate water based on 
political influence. In contrast, markets incentivize efficiency. For example, 
farmers facing the choice between selling water or using it to grow their crops 
may decide to either stop their production if selling water in the market is 
more profitable or they may decide to change their irrigation method for a 
more efficient one in order to sell surplus water.
Water transactions, however, involve negative externalities. As a result of 
regulations, parties to water transactions must internalize effects on some 
third parties, such as other water users. Nevertheless, externalities beyond 
those suffered by other rightsholders are often ignored. For example, it is 
often not required to internalize externalities suffered by the communities, 
such as the case in Weed, where the water transferred used to be consumed. 
The controversies like those in Weed emerge where water law gives individual 
rightsholders free rein in controlling (and transferring) water rights, and the 
community has no say in the fate of the water. When the water goes, the 
community suffers immediate effects such as job losses, along with long-term 
effects such as loss of opportunities to develop—without the community 
at large often having any opportunity to participate in the decision. Data 
from droughts can help illustrate the potential effects of water transfers. The 
effects of water transfers are similar (albeit more permanent) to the effects 
of a drought—jobs are lost, economic activity is reduced, and social morale 
is decreased. In Mendota, a city in California’s Central Valley, the unemploy-
ment during the last California drought was close to 70% when accounting 
for undocumented workers.3 When the water dries up, farmworkers cannot 
pay rent.4  Signs that pop up during drought of “no water = no jobs” and “no 
water = no future” could rightly apply to transfers as well.
Water transactions are not a new development in water management. 
Water transactions are a tool that has worked in the margins, reallocat-
ing water in times of drought without disrupting our mostly public water 
governance regimes. This, however, may soon no longer be the case. Even 
2. See Vanessa Casado Perez, The Role of Government in Water Markets, 10, 22-28 (2016) 
(explaining advantages of water markets).
3. Dyan Ruiz & Joseph Smooke, Farm Workers Surviving the Drought in California, People Power 
Media (June 15, 2014), https://www.peoplepowermedia.org/workers-rights/farm-workers- 
surviving-drought-california.
4. Marissa Lang, Without Water, Work or Homes: Farm Laborers Displaced by Drought, S.F. Chron., Dec. 
18, 2015.
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though transporting icebergs was dismissed as a solution to the California 
water crisis5 and transportation costs made oil tycoon T. Boone Pickens’ 
attempt to transfer water from the Texas Panhandle to the Dallas metro-
politan area unattractive to buyers,6 transfers are going to be an attractive 
option as water becomes scarcer as a result of climate change.7 Wall Street 
and international water mammoths’ investments in water certainly suggest 
that water commodification is going to become more prevalent in the era of 
climate change.8 The involvement of these large actors, such as Crystal Gey-
ser, makes the effects on the community more acute because the imbalance 
of power between the community and a multinational corporation is larger 
and because these transactions often transfer larger quantities of water, fur-
ther away, perhaps outside the watershed,9 and for a longer length of time.10
5. Santiago O’Donnell, The Iceberg Cometh: Drought: Towing a Chunk of Glacier Into the Harbor Is the Fifth 
of Eight Water Shortage Solutions the Council Plans to Look at in a $175,000 Study, L.A. Times, June 6, 
1990. A far-fetched proposal from actor William Shatner was toting water from the Pacific Northwest 
to California via a pipe. See Shatner Proposes Water Pipeline From Washington to California, KATU 
(Apr. 20, 2015), https://katu.com/news/local/shatner-proposes-water-pipeline-from-washington-
to-california-11-20-2015. See Clifford J. Villa, California Dreaming: Water Transfers From the Pacific 
Northwest, 23 Env’t L. 997, 1008-09 (1993) (discussing proposals to pipe water to California from 
the Columbia River and Alaska).
6. Alex Prud’homme, The Ripple Effect: The Fate of Freshwater in the Twenty-First Century 
263 (2012). After acquiring the water and getting the Texas legislature to give him eminent domain 
power over the land where the pipelines could be installed, there were no buyers willing to pay the 
price. Id.
7. Water-scarce regions of Georgia and Minnesota are looking to get water from water-rich areas. See 
Christine A. Klein, Water Transfers: The Case Against Transbasin Diversions in the Eastern States, 25 
UCLA J. Env’t L. & Pol’y 249, 267 (2008) (Georgia); Minn. Dep’t of Nat. Resources, Min-
nesota’s Water Supply: Natural Conditions and Human Impacts 8 (2000), https://files.dnr.
state.mn.us/publications/waters/mn_water_supply.pdf (Minnesota); Ron Way, The Great Siphoning: 
Drought-Stricken Areas Eye the Great Lakes, Star Trib., May 25, 2018.
8. Tim Gray, As Fresh Water Grows Scarcer, It Could Become a Good Investment, N.Y. Times, July 11, 
2019; Jesse Barron, How Big Business Is Hedging Against the Apocalypse, N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 2019; 
Water Emerges as “The New Oil” in $32.5 Million Sale of Vast Permian Basin Ranch, Dallas Morning 
News, Jan. 28, 2019, https://www.dallasnews.com/business/real-estate/2019/01/28/water-emerges-as-
the-new-oil-in-32-5-million-sale-of-vast-permian-basin-ranch/; Steve Brown, Far West Texas Ranch on 
the Market Is All About the Water, Dallas Morning News, Sept. 16, 2019, https://www.dallasnews.
com/business/real-estate/2019/09/16/far-west-texas-ranch-on-the-market-is-all-about-the-water/.
9. Water exportation occurs when the water is used outside of the watershed. Out of basin transfers are not 
always permissible under state water law. There is not usually a watershed limitation for groundwater, 
meaning there are no restrictions on where groundwater can be used after its capture. See Christine A. 
Klein, supra note 7, at 267. Bottled water is exported outside the area of origin—sometimes even to 
other countries—because it escapes the water export regulations. A water bottle company can do as it 
wishes with the water no matter whether it has a right to pump groundwater or to use surface water. 
For an overview of legal controversies related to bottled water, see Tara Boldt-Van Rooy, “Bottling 
Up” Our Natural Resources: The Fight Over Bottled Water Extraction in the United States, 18 J. Land 
Use & Env’t L. 267 (2003).
10. Generally, the further water is taken from its origin and the longer the length of the transaction, the 
more likely negative community externalities will occur. When water goes to another basin, users 
who depended on the surplus flow get nothing. Direct water exportation outside the basin is 100% 
consumptive, much like water bottles being shipped to another part of the country. See Vanessa 
Casado Perez, Inefficient Efficiency: Crying Over Spilled Water, 46 ELR 11046, 11047 (Dec. 2016). 
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These larger water transactions put a strain on the existing water mar-
ket regulations because the regulatory regime is built around transactions 
between two neighboring users with different marginal values for their water. 
Current water regulations cannot properly address the effects resulting from 
today’s water transactions where large businesses participate.11 This chap-
ter focuses on one type of such effects: those on communities. This chapter 
does not dismiss water markets but offers mechanisms to address the effects 
communities will likely suffer. With the advent of major players investing 
in all things water, communities are now in a more precarious situation and 
mechanisms to address the effects on the communities are now more neces-
sary than ever. Many economists believe externalities to communities should 
not be internalized because these community effects are just normal market 
operations.12 For these economists, the farm jobs lost, often jobs held by 
migrant workers, as a result of a water transaction between an agricultural 
producer and a faraway buyer, are no different than the jobs lost in the Rust 
Belt when companies relocated to other countries.13
But water is different. Many state constitutions claim that water belongs 
to the public, or to the state as a trustee for the public.14 Accordingly, water 
regulations should ensure that the public does not lose control over water 
resources as it is happening today as water markets involve powerful corpora-
tions and transfers to faraway areas. This chapter encourages readers to think 
of agricultural communities in the era of climate change-induced droughts 
and population growth similar to when western Pennsylvania’s steel industry 
collapsed in the 1980s. If water must flow uphill to money, it should not leave 
a dust bowl behind. While this chapter’s proposals to address the effects on 
community build on examples of water reallocation where those effects have 
been addressed, both the just-transition literature and the experiences of some 
of the towns successfully adapting to abrupt changes in their economic tissue 
Similarly, some transactions within the basin can have similar effects on the community of origin 
if, for example, transfers occur across sectors. While the water footprint of product exports is a very 
crucial topic, this chapter leaves embedded water out of the framework and focuses on the effects of 
transferring water itself.
11. The potential negative effects include: companies that have contributed to climate change profiting 
from the water scarcity induced by climate change, effects on the communities of origin, pricing 
out low-income population, and exploiting regulatory gaps, going against some of the underlying 
principles of our water regimes, such as the prohibition of speculation. For an analysis of those effects, 
see Vanessa Casado Perez, Liquid Business, 47 Fla. St. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2020).
12. Casado Perez, supra note 2, at 70-74.
13. Dan Kaufman, What Happens to a Factory Town When the Factory Shuts Down?, N.Y. Times, May 1, 
2019 (capturing the struggles of some factory workers needing to reallocate after the factory producing 
the Chevy model Cruze automobile was being “unallocated”).
14. Joseph Regalia & Noah D. Hall, Waters of the State, 59 Nat. Resources J. 59, 68 (2019).
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can offer lessons for areas suffering big water losses.15 In addition, privatiza-
tion of water utilities shares with water transactions the concerns about the 
community voice being muffled by powerful interests and having less of a 
say in its future development because water is controlled elsewhere. Accord-
ingly, the proposals put forward in this chapter may also inform regulatory 
responses to privatization.
Section II describes the landscape of water markets today, from the tra-
ditional exchange of water rights to the investment by big companies in 
water-related assets as climate change makes water scarcity worse. Section III 
analyzes potential externalities on communities as a result of water markets, 
particularly in today’s markets where climate change has made water attrac-
tive for big corporations. It unpacks the critiques of community externali-
ties by scholars who believe communities should not be compensated and 
it evaluates the levels of government involved in decisions concerning water 
markets and community externalities. Section IV offers a portfolio of mea-
sures to address community externalities and offers recommendations.
II. Water Markets
The term “water markets” encompasses many types of transactions. This 
chapter focuses on the effects on communities from water transactions. 
Nevertheless, because the effects on communities and the potential solu-
tions are applicable beyond water exchanges, this section reviews forms of 
water commodification greatly affecting the community: traditional water 
rights exchanges; new market developments as a result of climate change; 
and water privatizations.
Transferability of water rights ensures that rightsholders have incentives to 
use less water and sell the rest to whomever values it more. Hence, farmers, 
who are the main water users in most jurisdictions, may shift toward more 
efficient irrigation practices if they can profit from transferring their unused 
water. This efficient allocation mechanism incentivizes low-value users to sell 
their water to higher value users. The paradigmatic transaction is between 
the agricultural sector and urban areas. Some farmers may even fallow their 
fields to sell water, but others just invest in efficient irrigation methods or 
15. Pittsburgh is the poster child for recovery and a model to follow for the Rustbelt and perhaps for 
water transfers. But it is important to note that the area surrounding Pittsburgh is still in tatters. 
Some inner-city neighborhoods do not share the prosperity of the urban center, and nearly one-
quarter of the Pittsburgh population is still in poverty. See Joel S. Yudken et al., Revitalizing America’s 
Manufacturing Communities, Century Found. (Oct. 16, 2017), https://tcf.org/content/report/
revitalizing-americas-manufacturing-communities/?agreed=1.
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in crops that require less water.16 These transactions tend to be local, but 
as water becomes scarcer, it may become cost efficient to transport water 
long distances—even across basins. Such transactions can seriously affect the 
local community of origin. When water is transferred, jobs are lost, the over-
all economic tissue of the community is affected, and the community loses 
the opportunity to choose its future development because it may be hard to 
purchase the water back.
The privatization of water utilities is based on the premise that private 
companies are better suited than local governments to ensure a steady water 
supply to households. Governmental entities find it hard to finance water 
infrastructure updates and may seek such improvements to the systems by 
giving control to a private entity.17 Some perceive privatization as making 
water policy less subject to corruption and influence by interest groups.18 
Communities, however, do not always welcome this privatization. In Felton, 
a town on the California coast, Friends of Locally Owned Water (FLOW) 
organized events to oppose the private companies that had acquired control 
of the town’s water system, leading to the municipality regaining control.19 
Water privatization has negative consequences similar to transactions for the 
communities of origin: may fail to protect a key natural resource; increase 
water bills; ignore underrepresented communities; and fail to account for the 
public’s interest because the private companies are not accountable to local 
communities and may disregard their connection to the water.20 Addition-
16. Ari Levaux, Is Dry Farming the Next Wave in a Drought-Plagued World?, Nat’l Geo., Sept. 29, 2016. 
17. Joseph Dellapenna, Climate Disruption, the Washington Consensus, and Water Law Reform, 81 Temp. 
L. Rev. 380, 403 n.86 (2008).
18. James Salzman, Drinking Water: A History 201 (2013); Peter H. Gleick et al., The New Economy 
of Water. The Risks and Benefits of Globalization and Privatization of Fresh Water 27 (2002) 
(reviewing Mexico’s corrupt public provision of tinkered water). In contrast, those critiquing privatizations 
see the agreements as a result of corruption. See John Vidal, Water Privatization: A Worldwide Failure?, 
Guardian, Jan. 30, 2015; Kate Bayliss, Privatization and Poverty: The Distributional Impact of Utility 
Privatization, 73 Annals of Pub. & Cooperative Econ. 603, 619 (2002).
19. Prud’homme, supra note 6, at 272-73; see also Alan Snitow et al., Thirst: Fighting the Cor-
porate Theft of Our Water 49-62 (2007). Felton managed to buy back its water system. FLOW 
put a measure on the ballot for a bond to be paid with property tax increases. The idea was that the 
system would then be managed by San Lorenzo Valley Water District, a public utility. The private 
company that owned Felton’s water management system refused the deal but settled the case when 
the San Lorenzo Valley Water District threatened to pursue eminent domain. See Tara Lohan, How 
Felton, Calif., Achieved Water Independence, Yes! Mag., May 27, 2010, https://www.yesmagazine.org/
issues/water-solutions/how-felton-ca-achieved-water-independence. On a broader scale, opposition 
to water privatization has become a central tenet of the anti-globalization movement. See Salzman, 
supra note 18, at 22. For example, “opposition” was one of the five pillars of Italy’s left-wing populist 
5-Star Movement. See Dave Keating, On Energy, Italy’s Five Star Movement Could Rock the Boat, 
Forbes, Mar. 5, 2018.
20. Gleick et al., supra note 18, at iii-v. Some disagree about the accuracy of those perceived negative 
consequences. See also Adrian Moore, Why Water Privatization Adds Up, Reason Found. (Nov. 21, 
2003), https://reason.org/commentary/why-water-privatization-adds-u/.
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ally, once a water utility has been privatized, it is hard to undo.21 Privatiza-
tion efforts are not going away. Water is the new oil.22 Private companies are 
investing in water, and cash-strapped governments are willing to outsource 
the management of their water systems because they cannot afford necessary 
investments. The focus for privatization agreements should be on making 
privatization compatible with the publicness inherent to water.23 A report 
by the Pacific Institute does just this.24 It proposes several requirements for 
privatization agreements.25 Among these requirements, the report argues 
that the public should retain control over the system.26
Traditional water rights exchanges and water privatization do not paint a 
complete picture of what water markets are today. Any source of water could 
become a pot of gold as the effects of climate change set in. Big players have 
increased their presence in the U.S. water market. As captured in the movie 
The Big Short,27 water has become a coveted investment by Wall Street stan-
dards. Investment funds, international corporations, and wealthy business-
21. Gleick et al., supra note 18, at 5; Elizabeth Douglass, Towns Sell Their Public Water Systems—And 
Come to Regret It, Wash. Post, July 8, 2017 (describing the difficulties Mooresville, Indiana faced 
when it tried to buy back her water system).
22. See Julian Brookes, Why Water Is the New Oil, Rolling Stone, July 7, 2011; Andrew Ward, Water Set 
to Become More Valuable Than Oil, Fin. Times, Mar. 19, 2019; Steven Solomon, Water Is the New Oil, 
Huffington Post (Mar. 18, 2010, 5:12 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/steven-solomon/
water-is-the-new-oil_b_380803.html; David Wethe, Water Is Almost as Precious as Oil in the Perm-
ian Basin, Bloomberg (Jan. 24, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-01-24/
ranch-fetches-33-millionand-proves-water-is-red-hot-commodity.
23. Some authors may consider that in practice, there is no privatized model that can be compatible 
with water’s public value. The work of Maude Barlow is significant in this area. See generally Maude 
Barlow & Tony Clarke, Blue Gold: The Fight to Stop the Corporate Theft of the World’s 
Water (2005); see also Maude Barlow, Blue Future: Protecting Water for the People and 
the Planet Forever (2013); Maude Barlow, Blue Covenant: The Global Water Crisis and 
the Coming Battle for the Right to Water (2007).
24. See generally Gleick et al., supra note 18.
25. Id. at 40-42.The requirements are: everyone must receive a certain amount of water because water 
is a social good; public agencies should monitor the system; water should be managed based on 
sound economic principles so that companies exhaust all conservation measures before making new 
investments; and the public should retain control over the system. Other scholars consider competi-
tion between private companies to win a local contract a must. The Pacific Institute report though 
is skeptical about it given the market power of the big players in water, such as Suez Lyonnaise des 
Eaux. Id. at 34.
26. Id. at 42.
27. The Big Short (Regency Enterprises 2015). The characters who had sold real estate short on Wall Street 
decide to invest in water. In fact, “The Big Short” was also the title of a flyer used by those opposing a 
bill that would have blocked a major groundwater transaction between a farming company in the Mojave 
Desert, Cadiz, Inc., and Southern California urban centers. The flyer claimed that those favoring the 
bill and opposing the transaction only had their own profits in mind because they were betting against 
the company on the financial markets and would benefit from the decrease in Cadiz’s stock price. Ian 
James & Evan Wyloge, Bill Targeting Company’s Plan to Pump Desert Groundwater Dies in California 
Senate, Desert Sun, Aug. 31, 2018, https://www.desertsun.com/story/news/environment/2018/08/31/
bill-would-hinder-cadiz-water-project-stalls-california-senate/1158059002/.
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men are purchasing interests in water.28 In addition to the well-established, 
international water players such as Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux (Suez) (which 
has owned water interests in the United States since 1999),29 oil companies, 
large holding companies,30 and investments funds31 are entering the picture. 
They have invested in all things water, from water utilities to water rights, 
along with water purification systems. Larger transactions and powerful 
players entering water markets imply that decisions regarding water are made 
farther and farther away from the community of origin, reducing the pos-
sibility for the public to voice its concerns.
III. Community Externalities of Water Markets
In almost all water management systems, individuals hold water use rights 
with a backdrop of public ownership of water.32 The public ownership of 
water is more powerful in states with a more robust public trust doctrine33 
because there the state has to face more duties. But in all states, water agen-
cies oversee water rights regimes. In particular, water agencies must approve 
most water transactions. Market advocates frown upon the power of water 
agencies because they perceive bureaucratic decisionmaking as politically 
biased and a source of transaction costs.34 Left unchecked, however, water 
markets may ignore the human right to water or environmental needs.
Setting aside the fundamental question about whether water should be 
commodified at all, if water markets are in place like they are today in the 
western United States and elsewhere, it is worth asking how to address com-
28. Another way to put it is that “blue is the new green.” Salzman, supra note 18, at 22.
29. John Carreyrou & Amy Barrett, Suez to Buy United Water for $1 Billion, Making French Firm World’s 
Leader, Wall St. J., Aug. 24, 1999.
30. PICO Holdings Inc. acquires water rights and water-related assets, such as storage rights, in Arizona, 
Colorado, Nevada, and New Mexico. PICO Overview, Seeking Alpha, https://seekingalpha.com/
symbol/PICO/overview (last visited Apr. 18, 2020); Business Overview, PICO Holdings Inc., 
http://picoholdings.com/core-businesses.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2020). Seventy-two percent of 
its shareholders are institutional investors, which shows the credibility of the firm. Jodi Pearce, How 
Many PICO Holdings Inc. (NASDAQ:PICO) Shares Do Institutions Own?, Simply Wall St. (Nov. 
19, 2018), https://simplywall.st/stocks/us/commercial-services/nasdaq-pico/pico-holdings/news/
how-many-pico-holdings-inc-nasdaqpico-shares-do-institutions-own/.
31. Invesco Water Resources ETF, Invesco, https://www.invesco.com/portal/site/us/investors/etfs/product-
detail?productId=PHO (last visited Apr. 19, 2020).
32. Regalia & Hall, supra note 14, at 68.
33. See id. (analyzing constitutional provisions on public ownership); see also National Audubon Soc’y v. 
Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983) (providing an example of application of the public trust 
doctrine); Robin K. Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Western States’ Public Trust Doctrines: Public 
Values, Private Rights, and the Evolution Toward an Ecological Public Trust, 37 Ecology L.Q. 53 (2010) 
(comparing public trust doctrines as applied to water).
34. Texas Pub. Pol’y Found., The Case for a Texas Water Market 18 (2017), https://files.texaspolicy.
com/uploads/2018/08/16103756/2017-04-RR-WaterMarkets-ACEE-KHartnettWhite.pdf.
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munity externalities. Given the differences in water availability and the 
controversial nature of transfers—whether they be across political lines at 
national, state,35 or local levels—it is worth asking: (1) which is the appro-
priate unit of governance to make transfer decisions; and (2) which negative 
externalities suffered by a community should be compensated.
A. Levels of Governance
Although we speak of having public water rights imbued with a public trust, 
views differ as to who constitutes the public. Allocation of voice and deci-
sion-making power defines the public in “public water,”36 which is relevant 
when assessing what community is affected by water transfers.
Governance of environmental matters always faces the problem of mis-
matched scales.37 Political divisions do not match the natural borders of 
resources like water. From a scientific point of view, river basins are the 
natural unit of management for water quality and quantity.38 Even basin-
level management may be imperfect if staffed with technocrats. Water man-
agement needs to be both holistic and participatory.39 Local involvement 
may lead to sounder environmental governance.40 Communities have a par-
ticular attachment to water.41 This attachment should translate into some 
participatory mechanism for the community in water allocation decisions, 
35. See Nathan Weinert, Solutions for Interstate Groundwater Allocation and the Implications of Day, 44 
Tex. Env’t L.J. 105 (2014) (demonstrating an overview of the limits on state regulations restricting 
groundwater interstate commerce).
36. See Regalia & Hall, supra note 14 (defining state waters and what powers of the state apply to them); 
see also Leighton L. Leighty, Public Rights in Navigable State Waters—Some Statutory Approaches, 6 
Land & Water L. Rev. 459 (1971).
37. James Salzman & Barton Thompson Jr., Environmental Law and Policy 25-28 (4th ed. 2013). 
38. See Rao Mylavarapu et al., Watersheds of Florida: Understanding a Watershed Approach to Water Manage-
ment (Univ. of Florida June 2017), https://edis.ifas.ufl.edu/ss568 (giving an overview of watershed 
management); see also Jeroen Warner et al., Going With the Flow: River Basins as the Natural Units for 
Water Management?, 10 Water Pol’y 121 (2008) (analyzing countervailing arguments about how 
basin management can be politicized).
39. See Cecilia Ferreyra et al., Imagined Communities, Contested Watersheds: Challenges to Integrated Water 
Resources Management in Agricultural Areas, 24 J. Rural Stud. 304, 304 (2008).
40. Keith Hirokawa, Driving Local Governments to Watershed Governance, 42 Env’t L. 157, 160 (2012); 
see generally Keith Hirokawa, Environmental Law From the Inside: Local Perspective, Local Potential, 
47 ELR 11048 (Dec. 2017) [hereinafter Hirokawa, Environmental Law From the Inside] (giving a 
general perspective on the local potential for environmental management).
41. This can be illustrated by the fact that the water board elected by the population that votes in any 
other local election, not just by farmers, are usually more reluctant to approve water transactions. 
Barton H. Thompson Jr., Institutional Perspectives on Water Policy and Markets, 81 Calif. L. Rev. 
671, 734 (1993); see also J. Owen Saunders, Trade Agreements and Environmental Sovereignty: Case 
Studies From Canada, 35 Santa Clara L. Rev. 1171, 1180 (1995) (reporting that Canadians have a 
different reaction to the sale of water than they have to the sale of other natural resources).
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because the community will suffer the effects.42 Community involvement 
may range from mere participation to actual decision-making power, and 
is often included in bottom-up integrated water management approaches.43 
But these approaches are not that common. Even where they exist, commu-
nity involvement can be a challenge to achieve.44
In the United States, water is generally regulated at the state level, and 
therefore the interests of smaller geographical political units, such as munici-
palities or even an agricultural area, within the state may not be taken into 
account unless there is some decentralization of water management.45 For 
example, if the northern part of a state is humid and not heavily populated, 
and the southern part has large, thirsty cities, the state government may favor 
the more populous area’s needs because of the short time frame under which 
elected officials operate. The concerns of the northern community (where 
water may be coming from) are likely to be ignored.
Local governmental control also has pitfalls because local protectionism 
may block otherwise beneficial transactions for self-interested reasons. For 
example, irrigation districts formed by a group of irrigators often need to 
approve transactions between members and users outside the district. In irri-
gation boards, where the board is elected based on acreage instead of a one-
person-one-vote principle, large landowners may effectively ban potential 
transactions from smaller farmers or users outside the districts to have that 
water available for themselves at a lower price.46
Striking a balance between state and local control is not easy, and it does 
not have a single answer. Socially, we rarely know where watershed bound-
aries are. Political boundaries are more transparent and trigger opposition 
to water transfers. Opposition to water transactions is stronger when water 
crosses political borders. The farther the water goes, the more intense the 
reaction against it can be expected to be.
In some regions, water can only be used on lands within the watershed.47 
Water used within a watershed will make its way back to the same system. 
42. See infra section III.B.
43. Ferreyra et al., supra note 39, at 305.
44. See generally Erik Mostert, The Challenge of Public Participation, 5 Water Pol’y 179 (2003).
45. This comes from a case in Florida, where water management districts have a cooperative relationship 
with the Florida Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), which supervises them. Water 
Management Districts, Fla. DEP (last updated May 16, 2019), https://floridadep.gov/water-policy/
water-policy/content/water-management-districts.
46. Thompson, supra note 41, at 734.
47. Richard C. Ausness, Water Use Permits in a Riparian State: Problems and Proposals, 66 Ky. L.J. 191, 
203-04 (1978). The doctrine, however, seems to have been eroded in recent times. See Olivia S. Choe, 
Appurtenancy Reconceptualized: Managing Water in an Era of Scarcity, 113 Yale L.J. 1909, 1911-13 
(2004).
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In some states, local jurisdictions have tried to assert control: counties48 or 
groundwater districts49 want to have a say in whether and where the water 
may be transferred. Still, in others, political control comes at the state level 
via legislative approval; the state legislature needs to approve transfers outside 
the basin. For example, the province of Ontario in Canada outright bans 
transfers outside Canada, and subjects transfers to another Canadian prov-
ince to the approval of the provincial Minister of Natural Resources.50
In sum, it is not easy to define who is the relevant community. But more 
often than not, administrative decisions about water transfers are made by 
state agencies or departments. Their jurisdiction does not map the com-
munity where water is allocated away from. Due to this mismatch, it is a 
challenge, but not an insurmountable one, to ensure that the community 
of origin can provide input and mitigate the effects that may arise from 
water transfers.
B. Externalities or Protectionism?
Water transfers can negatively impact the communities where the water orig-
inates. Once water is sold, the exporting community loses both the water 
and the jobs that had been making use of that water, including farming-
dependent economic activity.51
The paradigmatic water transfer is across sectors, from rural to urban 
areas, or between distant wet and dry areas of a region. The more severe 
effects on communities occur where water sales come not from a more effi-
48. Ellen Hanak, Who Should Be Allowed to Sell Water in California? Third-Party Issues and 
the Water Market iii (2003).
49. Kathleen H. White et al., The Case for a Texas Water Market 12 (2017), https://files.texaspolicy.
com/uploads/2018/08/16103756/2017-04-RR-WaterMarkets-ACEE-KHartnettWhite.pdf.
50. Province of Ontario Water Transfer Control Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. W.4 (Can.).
51. The experience of Carson County, Texas, is illustrative. Before the exportation of its groundwater, the 
county had new car dealers and two farm equipment providers. After the water was gone, the one 
farm equipment business struggled, and there were no new car dealerships. Joe Patoski, Boone Pickens 
Wants to Sell You His Water, Tex. Monthly (Aug. 2001), https://www.texasmonthly.com/the-culture/
boone-pickens-wants-to-sell-you-his-water/; see also Robert Glennon, Water Scarcity, Marketing, and 
Privatization, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 1873, 1889 (2005); Hanak, supra note 48, at 81:
[T]he same studies also demonstrate that there can be significant localized negative effects on 
individual farm workers and businesses and on local public agencies such as school districts. 
Thus, there may be ethical grounds for devising mitigation programs, even when a transfer 
does not trigger the legal requirement to do so.
 These types of externalities to the community are not exclusive to the transfer of water rights. In-
dividual Transfer Quotas in fisheries also raised similar problems in ports where the economy was 
not diversified, and the quotas translated into unemployment for the crews. Bonnie J. McCay et al., 
Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) in Canadian and U.S. Fisheries, 28 Ocean & Coastal Mgmt. 
85, 94 (1995); Eugene H. Buck, Individual Transferable Quotas in Fishery Management 12 
(1995), http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/bitstream/handle/10535/4515/fishery.pdf.
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cient use of the resource, but from the idling of fields. If the water transferred 
comes from a more efficient use of water, a farmer will keep producing, and 
thus, employing workers and ordering supplies. In contrast, fallowing may 
lead to unemployment for farmworkers (direct effects), fewer business trans-
actions for farm suppliers (indirect effects), and broader effects on the rural 
communities in general, “such as reduced expenditures by households and 
other institutions that have lost farm income or income from related goods 
and services” (spillover effects).52 These combined effects produce a multi-
plier effect.53
Water transactions can reveal inefficiencies in water usage. Agricultural 
producers prefer to sell water used in lands producing low-value-added crops. 
Given the low productivity of those lands, the agricultural production prob-
ably did not use many production inputs.54 As such, discontinuing the pro-
duction of low-value-added crops may not impact the region much. A review 
of studies on water transfers and fallowing in several California counties 
shows that allowing between 6% and 25% of farmland in an area to be fal-
lowed usually affects less than 1% of the economic activity of the region.55 
But while the overall economic activity of the region may not be affected, 
there may be localized effects. Furthermore, as water becomes a hot com-
modity, water transfers can go beyond these parameters, and the community 
may suffer as a result.
Water transfers can imperil a community’s future development. An indi-
vidual farmer or farm company selling water might not have communitarian 
preferences56 and may not consider the broader present and future effects 
on the community. The local community may have a long-term view of the 
needs of the members, encompassing both current and future generations. 
The public trust doctrine, which covers water in some states, requires this 
long-term approach.57 For example, water boards elected by the local popu-
lation (not just by irrigators) tend to block transfers of water more often 
than boards with a different composition.58 Without regulatory mechanisms 
52. Hanak, supra note 48, at 89.
53. Id. at 81-82 (reviewing several empirical studies on land fallowing arising from water transfers, other 
pilot or environmental programs or regulations, and from simulations).
54. Id. at 124 (presenting the mitigating role that the mere economics on land fallowing have on the 
potential effects on communities).
55. Id. at 81.
56. See generally Thompson, supra note 41. Cf. Kyle Emerick & Dean Lueck, Economic Organization and 
the Structure of Water Transactions, 40 J. Ag. & Res. Econ. 347, 360 (2015).
57. Barton H. Thompson Jr. et al., Legal Control of Water Resources 654-73 (5th ed. 2012).
58. Thompson, supra note 41, at 734.
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ensuring that community impacts are accounted for, the community’s future 
development may be impaired.59
Water market advocates argue that although negative externalities—that 
is, effects on other users—need to be internalized, the negative effects on com-
munities—job losses, loss of future development opportunities, etc.—should 
not.60 For them, community economic effects of water transfers are no differ-
ent from any other economic transaction with winners and losers.61 In other 
words, relocating water is no different than a manufacturing plant relocating 
from the Michigan to China.62 According to these scholars, compensation 
by the parties entering into a water transaction to the community for those 
effects is not a matter of efficiency, but equity,63 which a market mechanism 
will not take into account unless its regulatory framework requires it to do 
so. The equity concerns are even more acute when the asset is water because 
its transfer affects environmental conditions in a watershed, which can be 
hard to recover from. Additionally, advocates of water markets suggest that 
those community effects are not to be taken into account because the situa-
tion could be reversible; the local community could purchase the rights back 
in the future if they value them more than the out-of-basin purchaser does. 
A local community may, however, be in no position to outbid large corpo-
rations like ExxonMobil or Suez. Importantly, the capitalist water market 
is premised on the idea that willingness and ability to pay should be the 
determinants of water allocation. It is questionable whether water should be 
allocated based solely on the ability to pay.
While not justifiable in efficiency terms, compensation for community 
externalities has occurred in water and in other markets. Economist James 
Murphy suggests that compensation for these negative externalities should 
only be transitional, temporary funds to encourage efficient behavior.64 
59. See generally id. (analyzing the California case for water markets and the interplay between government 
rules and traditional institutions which tend to be reluctant to transactions with external actors). See 
also Gleick et al., supra note 18, at 39. Cf. Emerick & Lueck, supra note 56, at 355, 360.
60. Gleick et al., supra note 18, at 71.
61. James L. Huffman, Water Marketing in Western Prior Appropriation States: A Model for the East, 21 
Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 429, 436 (2004).
62. Kaufman, supra note 13.
63. “Pecuniary externalities arise when the external effects are transmitted through higher prices. The 
stranding of assets that result from the exit of entitlements from an irrigation district can result in 
pecuniary externalities for the remaining irrigators. To the extent that these third-party effects do not 
create deadweight social losses, their removal does not improve economic efficiency.” Anna Heaney et 
al., Third-Party Effects of Water Trading and Potential Policy Responses 9 (2005), https://
www.pc.gov.au/research/supporting/water-trading/watertrading.pdf.
64. James J. Murphy et al., Mechanisms for Addressing Third-Party Impacts Resulting From Voluntary Water 
Transfers Running Title: Water Markets and Third-Party Impacts, in Using Experimental Methods 
in Environmental and Resource Economics 91, 110 (J. List ed., 2005).
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Examples of transitional remedies include: worker training and assistance 
measures to mitigate impact; improving the economic tissue of the region; 
and ensuring a transition toward a new economic reality.65 Water is more 
challenging because it is essential for development. If the majority of water 
rights have been transferred outside the area, future growth will be impaired.
When considering measures to address these community externalities, the 
risk is distinguishing between real effects on the community and pure natu-
ral resource protectionism.66 Natural resource protectionism usually refers to 
the practice of countries enacting anti-trade measures by subjecting foreign 
products to exacting environmental standards or restricting the export of its 
own resources, such as water. Canada’s water protectionism is illustrated in 
the free trade negotiation with other North American partners.67 But this 
protectionism can be replicated in other, smaller, geopolitical units. While, 
given the risk of natural resource protectionism, it is hard to ease out the real 
consequences worth considering, communities must have a role in deter-
mining the use of their water. Locals may better understand environmental 
effects, and thus, are in a better position to assess environmental and social 
externalities.68 The relationship between a community and water is different 
65. Hanak, supra note 48, at 88-94 (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of targeted versus general 
programs. Targeted programs compensate those more directly affected, such as unemployed farm 
workers or farm suppliers. Regarding the first, a claims-based system regarding cash compensation 
could be envisioned, but high administrative costs and the political economy of the affected group 
disfavor it. Other targeted programs include job search and training programs for laid-off workers. 
“General assistance might take the form of measures to improve the economic environment of the 
area, for example, infrastructure investments or reduced sales taxes, or might support specific projects 
of benefit to area residents.”). Lessons could also be drawn from the just transition framework put 
forward to offer a path of adjustment for those regions whose economic activity may be affected 
by regulations mitigating climate change. For an overview, see John Cartwright, Toward a Just 
Transition, https://www.wri.org/climate/expert-perspective/toward-just-transition (last visited Apr. 
19, 2020).
66. Christine A. Klein, Law of the Lakes: From Protectionism to Sustainability, 2006 Mich. St. L. Rev. 
1259, 1278 (2006). Some groundwater export restrictions may be permissible, dicta in the Sporhase, 
states that an arid state might be able to establish a relationship between the ban on exports and the 
conservation but did not say how to do this. Courts have been unreceptive to the conservation argu-
ments. See City of El Paso v. Reynolds, 563 F. Supp. 379, 388-90 (D.N.M. 1983); Nathan Weinert, 
Solutions for Interstate Groundwater Allocation and the Implications of Day, 44 Tex. Env’t L.J. 105, 
121 (2014).
67. Saunders, supra note 41, at 1182. The Great Recycling and Northern Development (GRAND) Canal 
of North America was a project proposed to dam James Bay to collect water “wasted” in the Quebec 
River and pump it south to the Great Lakes and Mississippi River. This project prompted the parties 
to the free trade agreement to make clear that the North American Free Trade Agreement did not 
generate any right to the water resources of the parties. The North American Water and Power Alliance 
(NAWPA or NAWAPA) is another project that implied taking Canadian water into the United States. 
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers envisioned taking water from Alaska and the Canadian Northwest 
through the Rocky Mountain trench and replenish the Colorado and the Mississippi systems. This 
behavior also exists at a smaller scale. Id. at 1181-84.
68. Hirokawa, Environmental Law From the Inside, supra note 40, at 11054.
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in nature from other goods; the long-term environmental effects are difficult 
to quantify, and the future of the community is at risk.
Regulatory measures and policies that address potential community 
externalities may not necessarily come with monetary compensation; they 
could be merely procedural. But procedural measures create transaction 
costs and only transactions that are clearly socially beneficial will be able to 
move forward.69 The next section offers a portfolio of measures to address 
these externalities.
IV. Internalizing Water Markets’ Externalities
Buying and selling water is not like buying and selling shoes or notebooks. 
We can buy a pair of shoes without going through a review procedure. 
That, however, is not the case for water. Water users are interdependent—
any change in a water right can affect other users. Many water transactions 
change the place and type of use. To account for the high likelihood of exter-
nalities and the interdependency between users, water transfers are subject to 
review procedures. Water agencies review all applications to sell or transfer 
water rights. In conducting the reviews, agencies consider the effects on other 
users and the environment. Transactions are often subject to a version of the 
“no-injury rule,”70 under which a change in a water right cannot harm other 
water users. But today, reviews do not satisfactorily capture the social impacts 
on communities of origin.
Below are options for incorporating community externalities in the current 
water transaction regime. The different mechanisms vary depending on the 
identity of the decisionmaker and the level of discretion involved. Sharp rules 
involve less discretion and are associated with fewer opportunities to lobby 
because a rule is not subject to bureaucratic fiat. Rules allow participants in 
the transfer to know the outcome beforehand, decreasing transaction costs. 
Standards do, however, allow tailoring to particular situations. The first three 
options involve more discretion, and the rest are more rule-like:
69. According to Bonnie Colby, there are rarely perfect mechanisms to compensate for environmental 
externalities in the western United States, and only transactions causing outrageous effects on third 
parties are barred. Thus, transaction costs arising from the review procedure can be a good substitute 
for the lack of internalization. She coins the term “policy-induced transactions costs.” Bonnie G. 
Colby, Transactions Costs and Efficiency in Western Water Allocation, 50 Am. J. Agric. Econ. 1184, 
1184 (1990).
70. 1 Waters and Water Rights §14.04 (2019).
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Option One (public interest review): Within the broad conception of pub-
lic interest already present in some transfer reviews,71 the analysis should be 
more comprehensive and cover present and future effects for the community, 
including consideration of the loss in opportunity to develop.
As the following examples show, today, vague references to public interest 
may not encompass the interests of the community. In Arizona water law, 
there is a broad reference to the “public interest” in the review of transactions, 
but it seems that only vested rights have been protected in practice.72 Cali-
fornia’s standard for long-term transfers reads: “[T]he board shall reject an 
application when in its judgment the proposed appropriation would not best 
conserve the public interest.”73 California’s policy guidelines suggest public 
trust (that is, the theory that water should be managed by the state like a 
trust for the public),74 public interest, and protection of the environment are 
separate rationales.75 But there is little guidance on how and what to assess 
under public interest.
Public interest standards can increase the uncertainty of review processes 
and may open the door to biased decisions; however, review under a public 
interest standard facilitates a case-by-case assessment of potential impacts of 
a water transaction. The discussion of public interest opens the discussion 
to the myriad of values that interact in water.76 A proposed Model Water 
Transfer Act for California offered a more targeted approach, directing the 
responsible agency to consider community costs when reviewing a transac-
tion if the water sold came from land fallowing.77
Option Two (public participation): The discussion of public interest may 
be conducted as a part of the agency review, but it can also be open to public 
participation, allowing the community to bring firsthand evidence of the 
71. See Cal. Water Code §1255 (2020). California’s petition for long-term transfers must include 
reference to the measures required by the California Department of Fish and Game regarding the 
mitigation of the transfer’s effect. Id. §1735. Section 1243 of the California Water Code establishes 
that “in determining the amount of water available for appropriation for other beneficial uses, the 
board shall take into account, whenever it is in the public interest, the amounts of water required for 
recreation and the preservation and enhancement of fish and wildlife resources.” Id. §1243(a).
72. Janet M. Howe, Arizona Water Law: A Parched Public Interest, 58 Ariz. L. Rev. 541, 543 (2016).
73. Cal. Water Code §1255.
74. National Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 718 (Cal. 1983).
75. State Water Resources Control Bd., Policy for Maintaining Instream Flows in Northern 
California Coastal Streams 24 (2010), http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/waterrights/water_issues/
programs/instream_flows/docs/ab2121_0210/adopted050410instreamflowpolicy.pdf.
76. See Michael Warburton, Toward Greater Certainty in Water Rights?—Public Interests Require Inherent 
“Uncertainty” to Support Constitutional Governance of Our State’s Waters, 36 McGeorge L. Rev. 139, 
147-50 (2005).
77. Brian E. Gray, A Model Water Transfer Act for California, 4 Hastings W.-Nw. J. Env’t L. & Pol’y 
591, 601-02 (1996).
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potential impacts. In some jurisdictions, public participation is formally 
required when the transfer reaches a certain level of significance.
In California, a hearing is triggered if water comes from fallowing and 
the volume exceeds 20% of the water supplies of the area.78 This provision 
ensures a right to participation in water governance,79 but does not oblige 
compensation for community externalities. Public hearings may encourage 
participants in water transactions to address externalities to appease the com-
munity, prompting a social contract—that is, a beneficial agreement between 
all the stakeholders. Multinational companies seeking positive reputations 
or companies that maintain operations in the area (such as the bottled water 
companies) might be particularly sensitive to such pressure.
Option Three (local veto): One step further is granting the public decision-
making power. Once the agency has reviewed a transaction, it could call a 
local referendum for voters to decide the fate of a transaction. Illinois con-
sidered, but did not enact, such a measure to allow local communities to 
decide whether their water delivery should be privatized.80
Option Four (total ban): Communities worried about the negative impacts 
of water transactions could take the extreme measure of banning all water 
right transfers, or at least, those outside the basin. This measure could be 
overreaching because water markets can bring positive change. While a flat-
out prohibition has not been enacted, regulations restricting groundwater 
78. Cal. Water Code §1745.05.
79. See Rhett B. Larson, The New Right in Water, 70 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 2181, 2236-66 (2013) (providing 
an account of a right to participate in water governance). Larson conceives the right to participation 
in water governance as a better embodiment of the human right to water than a right to the provision 
of water. The latter implies significant shortcomings in terms of economic and environmental sustain-
ability, which the right to participation does not share. Larson’s definition of the right of participation 
in water has much in common with negative rights. Nevertheless, some of the tenets he argues for 
the right of participation as he conceives it, have plenty in common with the rights of communities 
in this paper. He describes these participation mechanisms as follows: “Empowering disadvantaged 
communities and establishing procedural safeguards will facilitate fair and broad stakeholder partici-
pation in water-policy development and mitigate the effect of government corruption on sustainable 
and equitable water policy.” Id. at 2203.
80. Citizens Util. Bd., Rep. Connor, Citizens Utility Board Urge Support of Bill to Require Referendum Be-
fore Il Cities Privatize Water Systems, PR Newswire (Mar. 18, 2019), https://www.prnewswire.com/
news-releases/rep-connor-citizens-utility-board-urge-support-of-bill-to-require-referendum-before-il-
cities-privatize-water-systems-300813899.html. This bill was re-referred to the Rules Committee of 
the Illinois Legislature as of March 2019. Bill Status of HB 2392, Ill. Gen. Assembly, http://www.
ilga.gov/legislation/BillStatus.asp?DocNum=2392&GAID=15&DocTypeID=HB&LegId=118355
&SessionID=108&GA=101 (last visited Apr. 19, 2020).
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exports came close. For example, Butte County in California prohibited 
groundwater mining if water was transported from the basin.81
Option Five (partial ban based on the source of water): Another option 
would be to limit transfers to only conserved water. Such a measure would 
allow farmers to transfer water if they have increased irrigation efficiency or 
switched to less water-intensive crops. Such a ban would prevent the fallow-
ing of fields simply to slake the thirst of big cities and corporations. Thus, 
agricultural activity will continue in the area. Some counties or districts, like 
the Imperial Irrigation District in California, prohibit water transfers if water 
comes from fallowing, but allow transactions if water comes from gains in 
irrigation efficiency.82
Option Six (riparian rights): A different type of program could import 
some elements from the riparian rights doctrine and adopt a system where 
water rights are appurtenant to the land. In this theoretical approach, which 
has not been implemented, water rights could only be transferred with the 
conveyance of appurtenant land (land overlying the groundwater reservoir or 
riparian to a waterway).83 The water could only be used on that land. This 
arrangement should achieve a similar result as banning transactions outside 
the basin (as mentioned in Option Four), but transferability is even more 
limited. This mechanism locks economic activities in the area.
Option Seven (cap on out-of-basin or out-of-the-jurisdiction transfers): 
Restricting, albeit not prohibiting, transactions outside a community via a 
cap is another mechanism to address community concerns regarding water 
transactions.84 Such a program could protect community life and prevent 
environmental impacts. Instead of a total ban, limiting the amount of water 
81. Gregory S. Weber, Twenty Years of Local Groundwater Export Legislation in California: Lessons From 
a Patchwork Quilt, 34 Nat. Resources J. 657, 706 (1994). Mining is defined as pumping from 
groundwater bodies in excess of replenishment. Id. Nebraska restricted out of state transfers of 
groundwater. The rule passed scrutiny before the U.S. Supreme Court because although the rule 
affected interstate commerce, it protected public health and safety, which is at the core of the state’s 
police power. Protecting the health of the economy will not survive the scrutiny though. Sporhase v. 
Nebraska, 102 S. Ct. 3456, 3464 (1982). Baltimore took a step further and banned the privatization 
of its water utility. See Douglass, supra note 21.
82. Hanak, supra note 48, at 73 (Imperial Irrigation District had, like other local agencies, a policy disal-
lowing fallowing as a source for water transfers).
83. Currently, in some states, like Oregon, water rights are considered appurtenant but can be indepen-
dently transferred from the land. If the land is transferred, however, the presumption is that water 
rights are also transferred. Or. Rev. Stat. §§537.211(4), 537.330 (2020).
84. See generally Barlow & Clarke, supra note 23, at 89; see also Buck, supra note 51, at 6 (providing a 
non-water example).
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that can be transferred outside the jurisdiction may be an acceptable middle 
ground. This approach mitigates the effects of transfers: fewer workers will 
lose their jobs and the impacts on other sectors (like agricultural suppliers) 
will be smaller. Victoria, Australia, imposed a 4% cap on trade beyond the 
irrigation district, that is, on the volume of water entitlements that can be 
traded permanently out of an irrigation district.85
Option Eight (leases): Transferability could be restricted by allowing time-
limited leases but not outright sales. Leases are expected to have fewer, shorter 
lived effects.86 This would make water transactions outside the basin less 
attractive in areas where infrastructure is lacking. While parties could still 
transfer water, the effects on other users and the environment would be short-
lived, and thus, the review of the transaction could be streamlined. Given the 
huge investment needed to acquire easements and install pipes, investors may 
be discouraged from entering into time-limited leases.
Option Nine (limiting who can trade with whom): A way to allow water 
markets while preserving future development opportunities is by permitting 
certain right-holders to trade with certain other defined rightsholders. Trade 
could be restricted between types of uses. For example, all farmers within 
a basin could only transfer water rights to other farmers. This should keep 
agricultural rights within the community and reduce some of the indirect 
effects on businesses dependent on agriculture. If small business protec-
tion were a concern with water transactions—and it may well be given the 
increase of agribusiness—a similar system could be implemented based on 
acreage or crop and allow small farmers to transfer only to other small farm-
ing operations.
85. There is a cap exchange rate that is not fulfilled by the individuals, but by the state, which includes its 
own entitlements to further mitigate potential effects. Hence, even if the buyer in Victoria, Australia, 
will receive 0.9 cubic meters (m3) (equivalent to about 237 gallons), 0.09 m3 more will be left in 
the river (10% of 0.9 is 0.09) by the state from its own endowment. Therefore, the water left in the 
river is 0.19, more quantity than before in aggregate, even though the flow between upstream and 
downstream will be reduced. Vicky Waye & Christina Son, Regulating the Australian Water Market, 22 
J. Env’t L. 431, 444 (2010); see also Barlow & Clarke, supra note 23, at 89 (detailing an account 
on the inefficiency arising from the cap). 
86. Short-term transfers may have negative effects but those are expected to be short-lived. Thus, in Cali-
fornia, short-term transfers are subject to a less demanding review than long-term ones. The latter are 
subject to the California Environmental Quality Act, requiring an environmental impact statement. 
State Water Resources Control Bd., A Guide to Water Transfers, fig.1 (1999), https://www.
waterboards.ca.gov/waterrights/water_issues/programs/water_transfers/docs/watertransferguide.pdf; 
see also Casado Perez, supra note 2, at 68.
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This trading limitation is how some fishing individual transferable quo-
tas frameworks have preserved development opportunities.87 For example, 
Alaska has a tiered fishing quota system dependent on the size of the vessel. 
Larger vessels cannot buy fishing quotas from smaller ones. The aim behind 
this system is to protect small businesses.
Option Ten (free transfers but with compensation): Instead of banning 
outright all transactions, a better alternative may be to consider compensa-
tory mechanisms to revitalize the community. The compensation could be 
determined on a case-by-case basis after the review of a transaction. The 
determination ex-post of the compensation introduces uncertainty.
In past transactions, sometimes parties to a transaction assign a sum to 
tackle mitigation of the transfer effects and community revitalization. One 
of the largest and more important water deals, the 2002 transaction between 
the Imperial Irrigation District and San Diego, California, contained a clause 
establishing $20 million to mitigate third-party economic effects.88
Option Eleven (tax): Another measure that entails no discretion is a tax 
on the transfers. Establishing a fixed tax rate will avoid the discussion 
about the particular effects on the community of each transaction and their 
quantification. The funds collected could be invested in the community. 
In 2001, Butte County, California, established a fee (5% of transfer price, 
which amounted to $3.75 per acre foot transferred) to compensate for com-
munity losses.89
Each jurisdiction can choose from this portfolio and can deploy multiple 
regulatory options simultaneously. Given the potentially positive role that 
water markets can play in water management by putting water to high-value 
uses, two criteria could guide the choice of mechanism. First, jurisdictions 
should reduce transaction costs. Water transactions are subject to a demand-
ing review, which is lengthy and costly. Adopting a rule-like approach for 
community externalities would reduce transaction costs and make the review 
procedure less cumbersome. Second, transactions should incorporate com-
munity externalities accounting for the intensity of those externalities. The 
need to incorporate these community externalities into the analysis becomes 
more acute the longer the transaction and the further the water is taken 
87. Buck, supra note 51, at 6.
88. Richard Howitt & Ellen Hanak, Incremental Water Market Development: The California Water Sector 
1985-2004, 30 Can. Water Resources J. 73, 79 (2005).
89. Hanak, supra note 48, at 73.
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from the community of origin. Based on these two criteria, an advisable path 
could be subjecting transactions that are likely to impact the community 
significantly—for example a permanent transaction between the agricultural 
sector and a city outside the basin—to a tax and allowing public participa-
tion in deciding how to spend the funds collected.90
V. Conclusion
As climate change makes water scarcer and the population grows, water 
becomes ripe for investment. Water transactions have been a marginal tool of 
water reallocation, but water markets are becoming more prevalent. Power-
ful investors are buying surface and groundwater rights, purchasing interests 
in water utilities, and bottling water and shipping it far away. While market 
advocates argue markets and privatization are more efficient than an admin-
istrative agencies’ system of water management, they ignore concerns regard-
ing equity. Water is unique. The essential nature of water explains the heated 
reaction that any form of water transfer or privatization elicits. Water plays 
an essential role in the ecosystem, but also in our communities. We cannot 
grow our food without water, nor can our towns flourish. Once transferred, 
water rights are challenging to recover.
Current water market regulations are not ready to respond to the chal-
lenge. They lack a framework to respond to the effects that water markets can 
have on communities. The current landscape in water markets where large 
corporations are key actors makes this deficiency in our water regimes more 
problematic. Communities face a David-versus-Goliath situation in water 
transfers against the world’s largest private-equity funds, such as The Carlyle 
Group; biggest water companies such as Suez and Veolia Water Technolo-
gies; and other multinational energy companies such as Exxon.
While transactions differ on the effects they impose on communities, 
communities suffering immediate economic slowdown and being limited on 
deciding future development are a constant across water transfers. Acknowl-
edging that some water transfers are needed to continue western prosperity, 
this chapter presents mechanisms to attune our current water legal regimes 
to today’s water markets by accounting for the effects on the communities 
from which they originate. In other words, this chapter offers mechanisms to 
90. Past water transfer experiences suggest that deciding how to spend the funds collected to respond to 
community externalities is not easy. For the Imperial Irrigation District deal, “a committee of econo-
mists appointed by the county supervisors and the purchasing and selling agencies was supposed to 
administer it; however, the money has apparently not been spent.” Casado Perez, supra note 2, at 
153 (footnotes omitted).
Copyright © 2021 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC.
100 Environmental Law, Disrupted.
facilitate efficiency without neglecting equity, without neglecting the com-
munities where water comes from.
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